The development of Soviet Russia's foreign policy
By Marxistisk Arbejder Politik, 1935
Contents
Introduction
to the 2026 edition
The
development of Soviet Russia's foreign policy
The
First Defeat of the Bolshevik's Foreign Policy
The
Turn Towards National Self-Assertion
Entering
international diplomacy
Russia
Becomes A Factor of International World Politics
The
Pacification of Russia's Western Policy
The
Betrayal of the Chinese Workers Revolution
On
the Way To the "League of Nations"
Peace
Diplomacy in the World Crisis of Capitalism
Entry
Into the League of Nations
The
Inner-Political Presuppositions of the Latest Phase of Russian Foreign Policy
The
Liquidation of the Comintern
The
ideological justifications for Russia’s foreign policy since 1917 are part of
the toolkit of every group that claims to be Bolshevik. The influence of these
justifications extends from the classical Moscow Communist parties, through
Trotskyism to Maoism and other offshoots of Stalinism, all the way to Italian operaism and even to the Italian Communist Left—including Bordigistm, Damenistm, and the Gauche
Communiste de France. “The Development of the
Soviet Union’s Foreign Policy” presents these justifications—without further
theoretical analysis—primarily in their use to make the working class of
various countries subservient to what we must unambiguously call the imperialist
interests of the “Soviet” state.
In contrast
to this instrumental approach to the proletariat, the Danish council communist Marxistisk Arbejder Politik
(Copenhagen) highlighted in 1935 the harmful consequences for the workers, and
in the beginning also for their communist parties. In 1935 the text appeared in
the German-language Internationale Rätekorrespondenz,
and in 1936 as a pamphlet
by the Group of International Communists (GIC) in Amsterdam and in International
Council Correspondence (USA). The latter version served as the basis for
the transcription of the text now presented here. There also exists a French
translation of 1975.
A critique
of the Bolshevik “theories” is missing, leaving it often unclear whether a
theory is accepted or rejected. Some of these theories were shared by the
council communists of that time, though they contested their validity for
Western Europe and the U.S. Nearly a century later, however, we can point to
the proven inaccuracy of a number of these Bolshevik theories. This is
necessary because these theories, or parts thereof, are still being used to
serve bourgeois interests and against the working class.
Perhaps the
most important of these erroneous theories and practices was the idea that in
1917, a bourgeois revolution" took place in Russia comparable to
that of 1848 in Germany. The Bolsheviks believed that in Russia in 1917, they
were following the same course as Marx’s and Engels’ League of Communists in
1848. As the “party of the proletariat” (in Marx’s terms meaning the
proletarian masses), the Bolshevik minority party would carry out the bourgeois
revolution and, with the help of the workers in Central and Western Europe,
transform it into a socialist revolution. With the failure of the proletarian
revolutions in Germany and Hungary-Austria, the Bolsheviks focused on the
industrialization of Russia. All of this seemed to confirm the theoretical framework
of a bourgeois revolution, reformulated once again in 1934 in council communist
publications by Helmut Wagner's Theses on
Bolshevism.
The
revolutionaries generally regarded the First World War of 1914–1918 as an
expression of a new phase of capitalism, Imperialism.
The German
and Dutch internationalist social democrats, who later called themselves
“communists” just like the Bolsheviks, viewed imperialism as the
pursuit of every national bourgeoisie to gain as much as possible from the
redistribution of the world by war. With the completion of the capitalist
conquest of the planet’s most important regions, every war therefore became a
war between imperialist powers.
National
liberation and bourgeois revolutions were no longer on the historical agenda;
they existed merely as ideological justifications for war between one
imperialism and another. (The
fatal myth of the bourgeois revolution in Russia. 2020)
Lenin, on
the other hand, developed a different conception of imperialism. In the
multi-ethnic state of Russian Tsarism, under the slogan of the right of
nations to self-determination, the Bolsheviks sought to gain support for
their struggle from the national minorities oppressed by Tsarism. Lenin
reserved the label “imperialist” for the oppressive or stronger nations. Even
before World War I, the Polish Rosa Luxemburg had already rejected this policy,
and Anton Pannekoek took a similar stance against the nationality policy of
Austro-Hungarian social democracy by pointing out the dangers of bourgeois
nationalism for the working class. Finally, during World War I, Herman Gorter
formulated imperialism as a tendency of all states in a capitalist, divided
world. (The
inter-imperialist war in Ukraine – From Luxemburg, Pannekoek, Gorter and Lenin
to “Council-Communism”. 2022)
The global
experiences with “national liberation” since World War I ultimately
confirmed the theory of imperialism put forward by the German-Dutch
Left. Lenin’s theory, however, proved to be a useful instrument for Russia’s
foreign policy since the Bolshevik seizure of power. Other “socialist” states
and aspiring states (national liberation movements) adopted that policy, or
parts of it.
In
connection with the misconception of a bourgeois revolution in Russia, Lenin
argued that the monopolies and cartels that had emerged within
imperialist capitalism signaled the end of private capitalism governed by the
free market. Cartels and monopolies, he claimed, would be the organizational
forms of socialism.
The varying
use of the term state capitalism reveals that Lenin sometimes regarded
it as a form of capitalism with certain advantages, while at other times it was
equated with socialism, understood as the first phase of communism.
Lenin
derived these views from the reformist Hilferding and
from the German war economy, which he admired. The organizational forms of
state capitalism seemed appropriate for the industrialization of a largely
agrarian country following the 'bourgeois' revolution. This conviction is also
reflected in Wagner’s 'Theses on Bolshevism'.
With the
benefit of hindsight, however, we see that the introduction of industrial
production under Tsarism was driven by the increased tensions of war between
states in a predominantly capitalist world. Russia was already engaged in
capitalist relations of production under Tsarism. The “Soviet” state, as the
recognized heir to a proletarian revolution against the consequences of an
inter-imperialist war, initially had to defend itself against invasions—or the
threat thereof—by several capitalist countries. However, once the bourgeoisie
of those countries realized that the “Soviet government” was of their own
bourgeois kind, Russia was once again integrated into the alliances or,
conversely, the war tensions between imperialist countries. The text
clearly shows that this reintegration took place within a highly volatile
movement marked by just as many shifts in ideological justification—some of
which drew on the war justifications of Social Democracy that Lenin had
previously exposed.
State
capitalism meant that the dictatorship of the proletariat by the Soviets turned
into a dictatorship over the proletariat. The Soviets (Workers’
Councils) were soon effectively subordinated to the new government. The
councils even agreed to this, which demonstrates the weakness of the working
class and of its most conscious minority, the Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks,
as the ruling party, imagined that they were governing Russia, while in reality the continuing capitalist relations of
production—just like Russian imperialism—were governing them. The text of
"The development of Soviet Russia's foreign policy" is not clear
enough on this point when it describes the various shifts in economic
policy—from War “Communism” through the New Economic Policy (NEP) to the
Five-Year Plans—of the Bolsheviks, focusing primarily on which of the main
classes in Russia the state supports in the process: the peasants or the
working class. For us, both private and state-capitalist enterprises, as well as
agricultural cooperatives, are all bearers of the capitalist mode of
production, just as all forms that economic policies took in Russia were in
fact capitalist.
As the
managers of Russian capital, the Bolsheviks had every reason to present state
capitalism, or “socialism,” as progressive and superior to the
"private" or "market" capitalism of the rest of the world.
In doing so, they aligned themselves with the economic theories within Social
Democracy that predicted the economic collapse of capitalism. One exception was
Anton Pannekoek, who repeatedly demonstrated that these theories of economic
collapse were incorrect, most recently in The
Theory of the Collapse of Capitalism. The First World War was generally
regarded by internationalists as a sign that capitalism had entered its period
of decline, meaning that it could no longer overcome the contradiction between
the development of the forces of production and the capitalist relations of
production. They attempted to explain the period of imperialism in more detail
through crisis theories. The Social Democrats who participated in the war also
declared it “economically necessary.” Pannekoek opposed both in The
Economic Necessity of Imperialism. In early Comintern texts, this view of
the decline of capitalism repeatedly emerged. As the text shows, even into the
Stalinist period, the Bolsheviks continued to repeatedly invoke this view in
their propaganda. Now, after more than a century of capitalist growth in its
economy, it are only the followers of the Italian Left
and the supporters of Paul Mattick who view this period as one of capitalist
decline or permanent crisis.
Fredo Corvo, June 12th, 2026
Recent
developments in the policy of a number of Communist
Parties have been labeled the August 4th of the Third International. Although
this label has certain justification, it does not take into consideration the
actual historical background of these developments. When the phraseology of the
Comintern is disregarded and only the essence of its activity is considered, it
becomes evident that the present action of the Comintern is a logical step in a
process that was initiated in the first stages of the Russian Revolution by
Lenin himself. It ls a well-known fact that the
Comintern is completely dependent upon Russian Foreign Policy and in turn the
latter is determined by the inner development of Russia as weIl
as the position Russia takes among the capitalist powers. An outline of the
development of Russian foreign policy will clearly illustrate this
relationship.
The
Bolsheviks met the World War with a program for revolution in Russia which
contained all the fundamental laws of insurrection and which - due to the
necessity for the struggle against imperialist war - was internationalized.
This program was not based on proletarian internationalism - as it was for
example expounded by the German "Left" around Rosa Luxemburg -
but instead it was based on the social and political conditions of Russia and
the position the Russian revolution would be required to take towards the
imperialist policies of the European powers and their colonial suppression of
the Asiatic peasant countries. Upon these basic conceptions Lenin built his
theories which were to guide the Bolsheviks and the international proletariat
in their struggle against war and for revolution. The world war, he wrote, is
an imperialist war which must be terminated by the anti-imperialist revolution
of the working class. As this is an international task, it can be solved only
by the revolutionary socialists in their own countries. For we Russians the
situation is different. We must be content to accept the lesser evil, namely
the overthrow of the czarist regime through the combined forces of the workers
and peasants. Such a revolution, he continued, would merely be a radical
bourgeois revolution but it might mean the beginning of the world revolution if
other countries should follow our example. For example, the proletarian masses
might rise against their capitalist exploiters in favor of a socialist
revolution and the peasant and colonial countries in Asia, Africa, etc., might
rise against their imperialist oppressors in favor of national bourgeois
revolution. Such developments might serve to initiate a general reorganization
of the present ruling powers.
In
the highly developed capitalist countries of Europe, the proletariat -a class -
was thus looked upon as the advance guard of the world revolution while in
agricultural and colonial countries the struggle was to be waged by "suppressed
Nations". Lenin steadfastly believed that an amalgamation of these
forces - regardless of the prevailing antagonistic contradictions - would serve
the interests of the proletariat and the communist world revolution. As a
result of these conceptions the Bolsheviks deemed it proper to attack the
Kerenski regime in 1917 under the following slogans: No separate peace with
Germany; fraternization of the soldiers on all war fronts, ending of the war by
international revolutionary action of the working class; disregard of all former
and new annexations; self-determination of all national minorities up to and
including national independence.
Having
attained power, the Bolsheviks immediately began to carry out this program. In
a declaration of November 8, 1917, they proposed to all warring nations a "just
and democratic peace". At the same time, they appealed to the
class-conscious workers of the three most developed nations, England, France
and Germany, to give the Bolsheviks immediate support in their struggle. This
was to serve a twofold purpose: first, a compromise with the capitalist powers
in order to bring about peace, and second, the utilization of the rest period
thus won to arouse the proletariat against the master class speculating that
the necessary world revolution would soon follow Concrete reality soon proved,
however, that their plans were ill-conceived and unworkable.
The
hope of the Bolsheviks of a general soldiers' strike within the enemy armies
was not realized. The Bolsheviks themselves were unable to continue the war.
The old czarist army was smashed and demoralized; a new army could not be
stamped out of the ground. Furthermore, their appeals to the European
proletariat to rise against their governments met with no response.
Consequently, they began to question the hope of a speedy world revolution.
Only one point in their program proved to be effective: the right of national
self-determination led to the separation of the Russian border states, a move
which proved to be very disastrous for the young Soviet Republic. These newly
founded states suppressed at first the revolutionary movement within their own
boundaries, and later on permitted the Entente and
white guards to use their territory as a military base against the Soviet
Republic. These fateful developments forced the Bolsheviks to enter into separate peace negotiations with Germany. At the
conference of the two governments at Brest-Litovsk, the German generals
demanded more than the Bolsheviks were willing to concede, and Trotsky
attempted to save his face with the countermove: "Neither war nor
peace". But when the German armies began to march again, the Russians
were compelled to accept the German peace dictate under much worsened
conditions.
Shortly
before the conference at Brest-Litovsk, the executive organ of the soviets had
invited the Entente to participate in joint peace negotiations, but in this
note they included also the following passage: "Should the allied
governments refuse again to participate at the peace conference, the
revolutionary working class will face the task of wresting power from those who
in blind stubbornness do not want or wish to give the people the long desired
peace".
The
Entente considered such a language an open challenge and an indirect
declaration of war. All relations were severed and the Entente began at once
the armed intervention which proved so disastrous for Russian internal
development. The Bolsheviks, however, did not as yet
abandon entirely the hope of world revolution. They frantically believed that
the German workers would rally to their assistance as soon as the anticipated
collapse of the German armies would become an established fact. In the
meantime, they considered it necessary to compromise with whatever States were
willing to bargain with them and increase, at the same time, their propaganda
among the European workers. The development of events after the collapse of the
German war machine clearly convinced the Bolshevik leadership, however, that
the European proletariat was not ripe for the revolution and that for the time
being, the hope for a speedy world revolution had to be given up.
The
executive of the Soviets announced on November 28, 1917: "The leaders of
the successful revolution do not need any approval of any of the
representatives of the Capitalist diplomacy". Instead, the Russians
cancelled all Czaristic Treaties dealing with the division of Persian and
Turkish Territories and appealed to the masses of the working Mussulmen to free
themselves of their imperialistic exploiters. Their aim was to combat imperialism
from both sides, to meet the very aggressive imperialist invasion against the
Bolshevists. The numerous counter-revolutionary manifestations were supported
by the Entente powers with arms, money and special troops to the white Russian
Generals. These powers were not able to wage a direct
war against the Soviet Union due to the very critical situation within their
own countries. But nevertheless they succeeded in occupying the border
territories and gaining control of the Murman Railroad; they waged a direct war
with the Czechoslovakian Army against the Soviets, cut off Central Russia from
the Southern Russian corn supply, robbed a good deal of the Russian Treasury,
destroyed Soviet councils and had many Russian workers shot to death.
The
Bolshevists fought the counter revolution with terroristic force and utilized
all available resources in this obstinate fight. The period of war communism
was introduced to further Bolshevik interests in the Civil War on the economic
front. The revolutionary situation ln many European countries was expected by
Soviet Russia to introduce a Western European revolution which they believed
was due. The Bolshevists cancelled all war debts of the czaristic and Kerenski
Governments, but were forced to make a concession in October 1918, declaring in
a note to Wilson: "that they agreed for the president to participate in
negotiations with such governments that do not yet represent the will of their
subjects". They asked Wilson whether the U.S.A. and her allies would
stop intervention "providing the Russian people would agree to make
payment just as a kidnapped person would pay ransom to free himself".
In January1919 the Bolshevists again negotiated with the government of the
United States: "We share your desire to re-establish normal relations
between America and Russia, to abolish everything that may hinder these normal
conditions". Beginning February 1919, the allies suggested that a
conference be held at the Prince Islands with the aim of ending all
intervention through direct negotiations with Russia, and the Soviet Government
then declared in regard to the war debt problem: "to be ready to meet
in this respect the demands of the Entente powers", and they suggested
to guarantee their interest obligations by the supply of certain raw materials
as equivalent. For the first time they offered economic concessions and finally
declared that they did not intend to exclude negotiations regarding the
eventual annexation of Russian territory by the Entente powers".
All
these offers could not prevent the continuance of the civil war, as the Entente
Powers were set on the destruction of the Bolshevists. They were in an
extremely threatening situation when the first Congress of the 3rd
International was called to be held at Moscow during March 1919. The foreign
member parties represented there were very small and had to go through a number of decisive defeats. The chances for a direct
revolutionary action by the new organization was very slight. But the situation
was favorable and the first Congress was directed by the revolutionary slogans
of Lenin: joint agrarian and proletarian revolution; change war into civil war,
worker' s councils, dictatorship : "the old
capitalist order ceased to exist; it can't exist any longer".
A
Bolshevistic socialization program was outlined and the relations between
Socialistic Russia and the triumphant imperialistic powers and their vassal
states and countries of besieged imperialism were delineated. The newly founded
League of Nations was considered to be an instrument
of the holy Alliance of Capitalism to overthrow the workers' revolution; the
epoch of world revolution was announced. The days preceding the first Comintern
Congress were days of defeats in Europe. The March Revolt at Berlin, the
Rate-Republic of Munich, the Hungarian Revolution were decisive defeats by the
middle European counter-revolution against the revolutionary lefts isolated by
the proletarian masses. The Russians as before were in a pressed position.
Isolated, they believed the time was not ripe for a revolutionary upsurge ln
Western Europe. They started the Bolshevist tactics centralized at Moscow, with
its methods so well proven on Russian soil. "Appeal to the Masses"
was the slogan that made them trail quite unexpectedly along the path of a
radically edged opportunism. At the time when by means of the bad bureaucratic
methods of Radek and Levi the Communist Party of Germany was directed to
parliamentary action and participation in the work of the counter-revolutionary
Unions and the ultra-left majority was ousted (fall 1919, Heidelberg Party
Conference) they had not yet disposed of their illusions of a timely
revolutionary advance. However, as direct experience showed that Lenin’s
methods, so infallible in Russia did not work out in Western Europe with its
highly developed Capitalism, Russia had to establish herself as a national
state in the midst of her capitalist surroundings. Her
Comintern policy became, without altering her Bolshevist line, a policy of
deferring the West European Revolution. The revolutionary policy was never
given up, but it was changed from a problem of hazardous venture to a question
of an enterprise with a 100% success guarantee in advance. This meant, if not
theoretically, so practically the absolute end of all revolutionary struggle.
By
the end of 1919, the Soviet Government had succeeded in subduing by military
force the counter-revolution at home, i.e. to repel the cloaked invasion of the
Allies. The victory in the civil war, however, was accompanied by the defeat of
the system of war communism. In the first place, the economic supply of the
country diminished by 80%. Secondly, the proletariat began to rebel against the
terrorist dictatorship of Bolshevism and to demand council-democracy.
Furthermore, the peasants violently put forth their economic demands which they
emphasized by acts of far-reaching sabotage. (The Kronstadt rebellion was a
typical combination of the workers' political and the peasants' economic
demands. Trotsky, through Stalin's assistance, made himself the slaughterer of
the Kronstadt proletariat, surpassing a Noske in cold bloodedness and savagery
and thereby clearing the path towards fulfillment of the peasants' demands.)
The new economic policy (NEP) flung the door wide open to small private
capital, primarily of peasant and merchant character. A private economy of
small capital, controlled by the state, was to insure the economic rise of the
nation.
In
foreign politics, the Russians adopted the policy of retreat, after having
suffered a considerable military defeat in the war against Poland. In a
proclamation to the "toilers" of the Allied countries of
January 28,1920, Tchicherin declared that Russia had
no intention of expanding her power to any other foreign country or to force
the Soviet system upon any people against their will. The appeal for the
proletarian revolution assumed a meek and platonic character. Not the world revolution
but the necessity to establish her place among the nations of the world,
determined Russia's foreign policy.
Just
as Lenin - before and during the Russian revolution - developed a broadly
conceived strategy of making use of the various class forces, so he developed
now a strategy of making use of the various nations for the purpose of
strengthening Russia's foreign-political position. With the renunciation of an
immediate revolutionary world policy, was bound up the necessity of diplomatic
security for the Soviet state. Russia started with the first Western
securities. In the course of the year 1920, she gained
final recognition by Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland. These border
states felt that immediate pressure of the Soviet state; they also had the
urgent need for a counterbalance in order to escape
domination by the Western powers, at least to a certain degree.
This
policy of the small nations, which - with the assistance of the Allies - two
years earlier had put an end to the communistic revolution, caused Lenin to
proclaim in the year 1920 the direct alliance with "the bourgeoisie of
the small states". He declared that the Bolsheviks had been successful
in winning for themselves not only the workers of all countries, but also the
bourgeoisie of the small states, because imperialism was not only suppressing
the workers of all countries but also the bourgeoisie of the small states. For
this reason, the Bolsheviks "had won for themselves the wavering
bourgeoisie of progressive countries".
In
this period of growing alliances between the Soviet Union and the Bourgeoisie
of certain capitalistic countries, the second Congress of the Comintern
convened. It laid the foundation for a revolutionary bluff-phraseology, which
left the Comintern leadership' free of all obligations. The manifesto of the
congress announced the downfall of Europe and the world, and the uprising of
the proletariat: "Civil war throughout the world is the order of the
day". - For the rest, the congress directed its attention largely to
the colonial East and proclaimed "a policy of
concluding a close alliance between Soviet Russia and all movements for
national and colonial liberation". Particularly did the congress recommend
the organization of the peasant movement in the colonies with the aim of
creating peasants' soviets.
This
stand for an East-Asiatic revolution still implied a strong will for a peasant
revolutionary attack upon imperialism. The decisions with
regard to the Countries of Western Europa, however, were mainly of a
different character. There the Russians were interested in founding for
themselves a broad parliamentarian - trade union mass movement. "Penetrate
the Masses" demanded their slogans, giving directions for the
displacement of the old leadership and for creating Bolshevist nuclei in the
various reformistic labor organizations. The twenty-one conditions concerning
the joining of the Comintern by new parties brought forth no fundamental
struggle on the question of tactics. Parliamentarism, trade-unionism and the
ultimate demands for a proletarian dictatorship brought Centrists and
Bolsheviks together. These twenty-one conditions, however, served the Russian
leadership with regard to the mass parties of centrism
that were to join the Comintern. The old leadership was to be disposed of, the centrist - democratic traditions within the
organizations were to be destroyed. The lack of clear understanding among the
followers of these parties rather benefitted the Moscow leadership, which
intended to direct these organizations in the momentary interest of its complicated
foreign policies, and, at the same time, aimed to make them the reserves for a
future revolution. These two tasks necessarily contradicted themselves, which
explains the duplicity of the Comintern policies and led to the disregard of
the interests of the Western Europe proletariat. The core of all decisions of
the second congress, however, is to be found in the following statement of the
manifesto of the Communist International: "The Communist International
has made Soviet Russia's cause its own."
Moscow's
ideas of participating in International Diplomacy, born in 1920, blossomed out
during 1921.The gradual consolidation of the NEP brought with it the first
easing in the plight of this horribly distracted country. After the European
situation, the Asiatic problem was of first importance. Soviet Russia began the
diplomatic counter-attack against England's polities
in Asia. In February and March 1921, the U.S.S.R. concluded pacts of neutrality
and non-aggression with Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey. While Russia forsook
old Czarist claims and agreements, it gained the assurance of mutual military
support. Persia announced its readiness to admit Russian troops on Persian soil
in case of a foreign (British) invasion. Afghanistan gladly accepted the promise
of Russian money and material, and Turkey embraced the assurance of the "Nations
of the near East of her freedom and independence and her self-determination in
matters concerning her own form of state". Simultaneously, Soviet
Russia procured recognition from Poland which was then trying to liberate
herself from French domination, and finally, in November 1921, outer Mongolia
was taken under Russian protection. Besides all these achievements, including
annexing and Bolshevizing Georgia, the Soviet Union realized many political
victories all along the Asiatic frontier, which in turn improved her position
in the West as well.
The
NEP Program, of course, included the commencement of trade relations with
capitalist states, as well as the invitation to foreign capital to invest in
private concessions in the U.S.S.R. Europe, in turn, decidedly weakened by the
World War, was in no position to do other than to finally accept the existence
of Soviet Russia, and the latter's repeated assurances that economic relations
would lead to mutual economic benefits.
In
1921 Russia had already concluded economic treaties with Great Britain,
Germany, Norway, Austria and Italy, with Czechoslovakia following in June 1922.
All these treaties, of course, brought de facto recognition of the U.S.S.R.;
the German-Russian Agreement included even
extra-Territoriality Rights for Russian trade representatives.
Russia,
in turn, obligated herself to the strict enforcement of the so-called "Propaganda
Clause", and in 1919 already announced her willingness to include in
the general treaty with the Entente Powers this clause, i.e. "to
abstain from interfering in their (Entente's) home affairs". In
Germany, after the signing of the Russo-German Treaty of May 5, 1921, Russian
representatives had to bind themselves to repress all propaganda against the
German state or its institutions. A step further in that direction is
illustrated by the pact with Czechoslovakia. Here the governments of the
respective countries pledged "each to refrain from any propaganda
against the government of the co-signer or against any of its institutions, and
not to take part in any possible economic disturbances which might arise in
either country."
Great
Britain, finally in 1923, received from the U.S.S.R. the following declaration:
Russia shall not support or finance any agents, organizations or institutions
whose aim it is to create unrest in Great Britain, or any other part of her
empire no matter how loosely connected, and to impress upon her officers to
completely and permanently live up to this contract. (Memorandum of the Soviet
Government of June 4, 1923.) It is well known that this very clause led to the
severance of British-Russian relation in 1924 when
England, basing her argument upon the fabricated letter of Zinoviev, tried to
arrange a new contract. Directed against the Comintern, the new Pact, which was
not accepted until 1929, would also include persons and organizations under
direct or indirect control of U.S.S.R. and organizations which accepted money
from those. The Soviet Union, of course, refuses with formal right to have any
influence upon the Comintern, and this ia sanctioned
by all so-called experts of International Law.
Under
this shadow, the Third World Congress of the Comintern convened. Although at
that time Russia had only started an international diplomatic apparatus, it
nevertheless supplanted the Comintern foreign office very soon. As world
capitalism presently recognized the Soviet Union, Russia in turn gave up her
faith in World Revolution and observed the rehabilitation of world capitalism.
The perspectives of the Third Congress were greatly reduced when Zinoviev
announced: "The Third International has her tactical principles
adjusted to a slow development."
The
relative consolidation of power of the Bourgeoisie brought about a renunciation
of revolutionary activities of the Third International. By formally condemning
Levy (Germany) the Comintern refused to support the March revolutionary
activities in Germany and stated that the fight of the workers in the future
could only be defensive while the Congress theoretically decided against
centralistic leadership in Italy, practically there were not many changes. In
Germany, the C.P. amalgamated with the U.S.P. (Independent Socialist) while
they refused to remain with the "Ultra Left" K.A.P. (Communist
Workers Party). All these selected tactics, of course, brought the European
C.P. toward the S.P. The possibilities of "United Front from
above" and "the perspectives toward parliamentarian
Labor-Governments" were marked out, and it was under the influence of
those tactics that Brandler before a German Court announced: "It is the
goal of our party to establish the dictatorship of the Proletariat under the
Weimar (German) Constitution".
"Without
Russia there will be no restoration of world economy", Radek declared in
1920: This statement not only served the interest of Russian domestic economy,
but also those of world capitalism, and enabled Russia to begin negotiations
with Western powers. Having been successful in signing satisfactory commercial
treaties with several smaller states, she began the fight for participation at
the important international conferences. In 1921 she protested vehemently for
not having received an invitation to the Washington conference which dealt with
colonial policies (sphere of influence) in the Pacific Ocean, China, etc. Her
protests were in vain; but in March 1922 she obtained admission to the
conference at Geneva which dealt with the economic and financial restoration of
Europe. Tchicherin, the Russian foreign secretary,
declared in behalf of the Russian delegation: "Soviet
Russia is of the opinion that the present time which makes possible the
parallel existence of the old capitalist and the gradually developing new
social order, necessitates close co-operation between the two social systems,
in the interest of a general economic restoration". He continued to
point out the reasons for Russia's wish to obtain friendly relationship and
commercial treaties with other powers. And because "the economic
restoration of Russia - the largest country in Europe, with the greatest supply
of natural resources - is the prerequisite for a restoration in all other
countries" therefore Russia is willing to open its boundaries for
international transit, to lease millions of hectares of soil for cultivation,
and to grant extensive concessions in coal, forest and ore development. The
Russian memorandum assured foreign entrepreneurs more than adequate guarantees
and promised even to compensate foreign state subjects for losses suffered
during the world war. By offering such concessions, Russia hoped to obtain
capitalistic support for its own economic restoration. "The financial
support from other countries is of utmost importance for the economic
restoration of Russia" Tchicherin told Lloyd George, the leader of the
British delegation, on April 20, 1922. The eight capitalistic delegations at
this conference, however, demanded not only a number of
political guarantees but also repayment of the czarist war debts which the
Russians could not grant. Consequently, they arrived at no agreement. But in
their final memorandum the Russian delegation declared again: "In order
to bring about a mutual understanding, Russia is still inclined to grant far
reaching concessions providing the other powers do likewise".
For
Russia the conference at Geneva was not a success as far as financial support
was concerned, but due to the antagonistic constellation of the European
powers, it opened the road towards closer connection with Germany and soon
afterwards the two governments signed the treaty of Rapallo. Germany recognized
Russia de jure, and thereby won an ally in her fight
against the Treaty of Versailles. Both governments renounced all claims
regarding payment of war debts. "The Rapallo treaty opens the door to
Russia for German capital", Preobrashenski
wrote in a pamphlet. The German capital, however, was not utilized in the
interest of Russian restoration but instead was used for building German
airplanes and poison gas factories. It is even suspected that there existed a
secret clause in the treaty which called for close military co-operation in
case of a German-Polish war similar
to the one which called for combined military operation against France
should Germany choose to liberate herself from the Treaty of Versailles.
The
elimination of Germany as a possible aggressor through the Treaty of Rapallo
induced Russia to seek similar treaties with her border states. She offered to
reduce her standing army to 200,000 but when the border states refused to
discuss disarmament, Russia, in turn, refused to participate at a conference
which was to discuss non-aggression pacts. Through this maneuver, Russia
indirectly obtained for herself a raison d'etre for
the anticipated German-Polish war - a circumstance
which seems to indicate the existence of the above mentioned
secret clause. Russia thus became the partner of Germany, a state which
bitterly struggled to restore its former imperialist position.
Strengthened
by the Treaty of Rapallo, Russia began to exploit the capitalistic antagonisms
between the great powers in order to obtain further
concessions and thus fortify her own position. The Fourth world congress of the
Communist international which assembled early in 1922 in Moscow was given the
task of revising the "line" of the Comintern parties along
these new developments, a task which - needless to say - was
solved in an extraordinary fashion. More distinct than ever before was Russia
the center, the alpha and omega, of international Bolshevik politics.
"The
greater and stronger Russia becomes, the more powerful will become her
revolutionary influence internationally" read the theses about tactics.
Questions concerning the German situation were paid added attention and the
resolution about the treaty of Versailles spoke of a people which "disarmed
and deprived of all defensive means is at the mercy of the imperialist
powers". This was said of a Germany whose rulers had just completed a
bloody campaign against the revolutionary working class. The congress advised
the German and French CP's to fight unitedly against
the shameful treaty of Versailles. On questions regarding united front action,
it was considered important to fraternize on an ever-broadening basis with
social-democratic organizations. In conclusion the thesis declared: "Since
the CI emphasizes the slogan for united front action of all workers and since
the Cl permits her various sections to cooperate with groups and parties of the
Second and Second-a-half Internationals therefore the
Cl cannot refrain from entering similar' agreements on an international
scale." The Comintern was thus led close to the Second International
whose immense parliamentary and moral influence - it was hoped - would
accelerate the Bolsheviks' endeavor to gain capitalist concessions. The result
of this change in policy, the theory of a "workers coalition
government", was developed. Such a coalition, the Comintern pointed
out, not only could be possible but actually would be
desirable as it is the logical step towards the complete abolition of the
capitalist system.
All
these resolutions were made to fit the German situation, and to suit the German
military clique with whom the proposed secret military treaty was still an
uncertainty. The CPG, however, began in impudent frivolity to prepare the stage
for a national peoples
front. Later, at the party congress in Essen (1925), the CPG declared that
until 1923 Germany was not an imperialist but a nationally suppressed country
and the at that time expected war with France would not have been an
imperialist war but instead a national war waged fer the purpose of liberating
a suppressed people. In such a case, it would have been the duty of the CPG to
support it unhesitatingly. It seems hardly conceivable that the ECCI in 1923
considered it possible to carry its "socialism" on the
bayonets of the red army to Germany, and after having succeeded in helping her
to throw off the Treaty of Versailles undertake the difficult task of crushing
the united German bourgeoisie. It is worthy to note that this ideology
resembles to a hair the one expounded by the National communist Wolfheim-Lauffenberg (actually Wolfheim and Lauffenberg;
translator's note), in 1919. But even Lenin himself renounced whatever basic
revolutionary ideas were left in the Comintern when he declared that socialism
in the highly developed countries of Europe would not grow out of the
capitalistic economic contradictions but rather through imperialist
exploitation of one state by another. (Coll. Works, Vol. XVIII, p. 136; Russ.
ed.)
Having
thus formulated the new slogans, the Comintern began to identify the German war
for national liberation with the German workers revolution. Still greater
stress was laid upon the necessity for united front action and parliamentary
participation in coalition governments. This change in policy met with success
in Thuringia and Saxonia (1923) where CP and SP
members formed coalition governments. This sacrifice to their revo1utionary
principles was made, explained the communist leaders, in
order to assure success for the real German revolution which was
scheduled to break out in the fall of 1923. At the last minute, however, after
all plans had been carefully worked out, the orders for the uprising were
withdrawn "due to the treachery of the SPG and the inability of certain
communist leaders". The fact, however, is that the Comintern had
suddenly discovered that an armed insurrection of the German proletariat would
not lie in the interest of Russia’s foreign policy and for that reason the
German proletariat had to be sacrificed. With this step the Comintern, which
for years had subordinated the world revolution to inner Russian development,
completely abandoned the last straws of revolutionary class-consciousness.
Russia realized that neither a war against France nor a revolution in Germany
would be of any benefit to her. She accepted as the lesser evil the "status
quo", and
thereby laid the foundation for the now "famous" slogan of "socialism
in one country".
Although
a quick economic recovery was achieved in the NEP period, the final results, nevertheless, were considerably below the
Bolshevist expectations. The difficulties of construction increased; the first
planned experiments were experiments outside of the economic system, and the
foreign concessions continued to be of very moderate size. Therefore, the
energies of the Bolsheviks were concentrated on the interior situation, and
there the difficulties demanded their whole attention. Their foreign policies
towards Western capitalism were of a purely diplomatic-defensive function:
development of economic relations, protection against all disturbances and
interferences, no matter whether of war-like or revolutionary character.
Russia's
relations to Germany lost their former intimacy, although further cooperation
was assured on a remote scale under the leadership of German "Reichswehr"
circles. A German-Russian commercial treaty was signed
in 1925 which for a long time occupied the first place in the Russian business.
In 1926 there even resulted a non-aggression pact which evidently represented
the continuation of the German-Russian cooperation in
the Polish question.
Apart
from this, further relations between Russia and other capitalist powers were
developed. Still in 1923 it declared its willingness to participate in a
conference for the restriction of sea-armaments. In the course
of 1924 it finally succeeded in obtaining the official (volkerrechtliche) recognition from a
number of countries. Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece,
Sweden, Denmark, Mexico, Hedschas, Hungaria, France,
etc. resumed normal diplomatic relations with Russia in 1924. Beginning of 1925
Japan followed suit. Only the U.S.A., which was sufficiently occupied with its
own internal problems, did not follow.
The
fifth world congress of the Comintern, which took place in the summer of 1924,
responded adequately to the "changed situation", i.e. the
changed character of the foreign policies. Thus it
took notice of the "beginning of a certain democratic-pacific
phase" in the world policies, and it praised the Soviet Union as the
only country with a policy of "real peace". As usual, the responsibility
for the German defeat was denied by the leadership of the Comintern. For this
they held responsible, according to the resolution on the report of the ECCI,
the "deceit of the leaders of the SPG and the inability of the
leadership of the CPG." The united front tactics were now regarded as
only "a revolutionary method of agitation and mobilization of the
masses"; the "right deviation" of Brandler-Thalheimer
was recorded (with the simultaneous election of Brandler as honorary chairman
of the congress); and the short era Ruth Fischer-Maslow was approved of to
conceal the defeat of the Comintern. Practically, the strengthened "ultra
left" phraseology was combined with purely parliamentary perspectives.
Although the Socialist Parties were called the third parties of the bourgeoisie
the possibility of the formation of "workers' governments" in
a "number of countries" was viewed visible. Such governments
would "objectively" mean progress as they announced the decay
of the bourgeoisie. The task of the "real followers of the proletarian
revolution" would consist in "transforming the so-called workers'
governments into "the dictatorship of the proletariat". However,
the parliamentary'-cretinist character of the
Comintern doubtlessly reached the limit with the consideration of the German
defeat. It was declared: "After the severest defeat of the
revolutionary movement in Germany, after a subsequent inner crisis and after
the most brutal persecutions, the Communist Party of Germany succeeded in
quickly reassembling its ranks, created a strong and able leadership and
demonstrated, through a brilliant election victory with three and three quarter
million votes its revolutionary force as being larger and stronger than ever
before". Thus, the revolutionary movement in Germany in the autumn of
1923, defeated with the aid of the Comintern, gave the latter cause to
celebrate the "revolutionary force" of an "election
victory" which, incidentally, lasted only to December of the same
year.
Having
switched over to this course, the Comintern parties now represented nothing but
a thorn in the flesh of the capitalist countries, operated in a half-putschistic and half-parliamentary fashion, and
representing a reserve iron which could at a later time
eventually again be used on the soviet anvil. In this course the leaders of the
Comintern took care that the fire was properly banked. Already in 1925, the "ultra
lefts" Fischer-Maslow were disposed of, an action which led to the
splitting off of the Trotskyan "Lenin
Group" and which resulted in bringing the kowtowing Thalmann to the
foreground. In reality, Russia tried to suppress any
revolutionary movement. Although Germany did not represent any field for
revolutionary action after the shameful and fightless
defeat of 1923, England now became the place of an increasing crisis. Unable to
build an effective C.P. in England, the Bolshevists made every possible effort
to find a counterforce against the sharp anti-Russian course of the English
bourgeoisie. They accepted the ultra-reformistic trade unions as this
counterforce and figured on their parliamentary influence. From 1925 to 1927
the glorious Anglo-Russian Committee was active, the united front between the
leadership of the Russian State and English reformism, as a united front
against the anti-Russian diplomacy of England as well as against the English
proletariat. In 1926 the gigantic English miners' strike took form, the largest
workers' fight in English history. The British trade unions, allied with the
Russians, suppressed the general strike and prevented extension of the fight to
the front of all the English working class. During nine hard months of terrific
struggling, neither trade unions nor the Bolshevists came to the aid of the
starving English miners who were giving their blood for the proletarian sake.
Carefully avoiding any steps of attack, the Bolsheviks continued the activity
of the Anglo-Russian Committee, as their diplomatic interests were worth far
more to them than the interests of the English and the international
proletariat. The Bolsheviks tried to avert any danger of war against their
country, but simultaneously they prevented the European revolution which would
threaten their shaking social system just as much as a military detonation.
Abandoning
their hope for a speedy revolution in Europe, the Bolsheviks began to direct
their "revolutionary activities" towards the East. At the time the
Comintern was calling off the German revolution in October 1923, they were busy
organizing the first international peasant congress. With this instrument - the
peasant International - they hoped to embrace all colonial and half colonial
peasant countries and unite them - as they had done before with the Communist
Parties - under the leadership of Moscow. In spite of the
fact that their attempt met with little success due to adverse objective
conditions, they never ceased to bend every effort toward achieving that goal.
Even as late as 1928, the sixth world congress of the Comintern instructed the
ECCI to renew its activity towards the founding of an international peasant
soviet. We may recall here that the fifth world congress (Summer 1924) had
already ratified the organization of the peasant international and had
instructed its sections to work in closer contact with the peasant
organizations in order to consolidate everywhere "workers
and peasants’ blocs". These resolutions were made to fit the situation
in China and to introduce the new policy under which the Chinese Communist
Party was compelled to cooperate with the Chinese nationalist party, the
KUO-MIN-TANG.
The
theses condoning the new tactics frankly stated that "the Comintern had
paid too much attention to the development in Europe" and that it is
now of utmost importance to further the development of those mass movements ln
the East which struggle to liberate themselves from the imperialist oppression
and from which - as Stalin declared - would spring the decisive initiative for
the world revolution. But also here the Bolsheviks
played a double role. While they endeavored to mobilize the peasant masses, at the
same time they signed pacts of mutual agreement and understanding with the
respective governments. ln the pact with Turkey, they renounced all
revolutionary activity because Kemal Pasha held the key position to Minor Asia
about which a silent but bitter struggle was being waged between Russia and
England. That under Kemal Pasha's regency every Communist was imprisoned or
even hanged did not bother the Russian Bolsheviks. The treaty with Turkey in
1926 followed the treaty with Afghanistan which provided mutual armed support
should a third party trespass the borders of either of the two signatories.
Russia thereby hoped to prevent England from using Afghanistan as a military
base against her. A similar pact was signed in 1927 with Persia. These treaties
were important to Russia insofar as they protected her South-Eastern frontier
against an English invasion.
Of
far greater importance, however, were the treaties she signed with China in
1924. The Chinese governments in Manchukuo and Peiping recognized her de jure.
Russia annulated the czarist treaties, renounced all compensation due her for
the boxer rebellion, and established China's right, on an equal basis, to the
Eastern Railroad. This treaty brought about closer relationship to the
Kuomintang which was openly supported by the Bolsheviks. An
harmonious co-operation between the Chinese Republic and Russia appeared to be
a certainty.
The
Bolsheviks were victorious in Russia because they had been able to combine the
interests of the workers with those of the peasants, and in their conception
world revolution was merely a repetition of this procedure on an international
scale. Although they had to realize that this policy was instrumental in the
defeat of the European proletariat, they nevertheless hoped to employ it
successfully in China. Since 1925, the revolutionary movement of the Chinese
proletariat had registered an hitherto unknown
upswing, and China became the only country in Asia in which it was possible for
the Comintern to build up a strong and active party. In conformity with the leninist-stalinist theory of the national liberation of
imperialistically oppressed nations, this party - which had led heroic
struggles against an infantile capitalism - was compelled to join the
Kuomintang. The Bolsheviks instructed the CPCh to
organize united front bodies with the Bourgeoisie and middle class. In 1926,
the Kuomintang began in Canton the military offensive against the rebellious
Northern provinces. Within two years they were the sole rulers of China. This
speedy success had been made possible by the many revolts of the peasants and
workers against the Northern generals. Shanghai was conquered in 1927, again
with the aid of the workers who had risen against the Peiping troops. After the
capture of Shanghai, the victorious Kuomintang general Chiang-Kai-chek demanded disarmament of the proletariat. The CPCh, following the advice of their Russian comrades,
surrendered all weapons after which Chiang-Kai-chek
ordered the persecution and beheading of thousands of rebellious workers.
Moscow betrayed the proletariat of Shanghai because it considered a mutual
understanding with the bourgeois elements and their butcher-general of greater
importance. The CPCh had to remain within the
Kuomintang but shortly later it was dealt another severe blow. Instead of
attacking the Northern stronghold Peiping, Chiang-kai-chek's
army marched against Wuhan where a communist government had been erected. The
leaders of this government - all of them were former influential delegates to
the Comintern - saved their necks by joining the invading hostile forces. This
development must be considered as the logical consequence of the national
policy the Comintern had pursued in China. Moscow tried to white-wash herself
by expelling scores of 'unworthy' leaders.
The
proletarian uprising of the Canton workers against the regime of Chiang-Kai-chek in December 1927 - which was organized by
Heinz-Neumann - was not only a hazardous adventure, but a deliberate crime.
Thousands of workers lost their lives in what was known beforehand a losing
battle, and thousands of others were massacred after the struggle. The Canton
Soviet of 1927 can be compared with the Paris Commune of 1871: both struck a
deathly blow to the revolutionary working class. The defeat at Shanghai and Canton
- instigated and provoked by the Comintern - choked the Chinese revolutionary
movement.
Only
very slowly and laboring under great difficulties, the CPCh
began to rebuild the party but not any more as a workers' organization but
instead sought to recruit new members from the peasantry. Sinoe 1930 she has
been actively engaged in many peasant uprisings and was also instrumental in
the formation of the so-called Soviet-China, which comprises a few provinces in
the interior. Moscow managed to remain the adviser and guide, and at this front
it is really aggressive. But as Russia's activity in
Eastern Asia embodies grave consequences to English interests, the latter
untiringly endeavors to head off the Russian drive by irritating diplomatic
maneuvers in Europe which compel Moscow to act with utmost caution and further
compromises to her Western neighbors.
Should
China consolidate in one form or another it is highly probable that Russia
would completely abandon her interest in the Chinese revolution - certain
recent events point already in that direction - and would confine herself to
the "building of Socialism" within her own boundaries. She
would then - as far as Asia is concerned - follow the road she has pursued in
Europe since 1923.
When
- after a four-year intermission - the sixth world congress of the Comintern
assembled in the year 1928, the liquidation of the Chinese workers' revolution
had only to be recorded. It had by this time been noted even in Moscow that the
Kuomintang had "gone definitively over into the camp of the
counter-revolution" and inflicted "severe defeats" on
peasants and workers of China. The orientation upon the peasant movement was
clearly expressed and entered as the last credit item in Comintern affairs: "The
colonial countries are at present the most dangerous sector for the front of
world imperialism", declared the Theses on the revolutionary movements
in the colonies and semi-colonies. Accordingly, very detailed directions were
worked out for the Bolshevist policy in the larger colonial and semi-colonial
areas, and orders were given for the forming there of Comintern parties. It is
a matter of note that the theses with reference to colonial policy occupy 45
pages in the official protocol of the congress, while the theses on tactics of
the Comintern as a whole require only 31 pages. Moscow
activity was therefore unequivocally directed toward the East, and in fact
toward the peasant East.
If
the Comintern adopted a more aggressive tone on the questions of European
policy as well, that was, on the one hand, a natural consequence of the altered
political situation in Russia itself; it was also, however, the new deceptive
maneuver for distracting attention from the policy of drawing still closer to
the bourgeoisie of Western Europe.
In
1928 the NEP-policy came to its final close. On the question of forced
organization and concentration of industry and agriculture, the Bolshevist
government went over to downright state-capitalism, to the offensive. The first
five-year plan was proclaimed, collectivization introduced, the struggle taken
up against NEP-speculators, small traders and kulaks , In harmony with this
intensified course of action, the sixth congress proclaimed the famous theory
of the "third period", which was to lead to war between the
imperialist powers and to war against the Soviet Union as well as to the utmost
sharpening of the general crisis of capitalism. The year 1929 was the year of
the highest post-war boom of the capitalist countries; nevertheless, in this
same year the CP of Germany, for example, worked the revolutionary watchwords
to death by means of continual calls a for strikes or
general strikes, calls which met with general ridicule. They drove the
unemployed into senseless actions which used up their energies before the
subsequent crisis began to require the throwing in of the proletarian forces.
The rapprochement with the SP was broken off, this party was declared the
representative of "social fascism", the trade unions were "split"
by means of the "red union opposition" (RGO) fiasco, work in
the factories was given up in favor of the exclusive organization of the
unemployed.
At
the same time, with the turn in German foreign policy, the sixth congress laid
it down that the anti-Soviet block of imperialist powers was completed. It
needed this false and delusive thesis because the Russians, with the close of
the Chinese adventure, had renounced all really revolutionary
action on the part of the international working class and accordingly, wearing
the halo of the five-year plan, shoved into the foreground the decorative
slogan of "socialism in one country". World imperialism vs. Soviet
Union: that became the formula of the Comintern's perspectives as simplified by
the Stalinist regime, while at the same time the Soviet Union, for the same
reason of furthering the five-year-plan policy, threw itself definitely into
the course of economic and politico-pacifistic understanding with the
imperialist world powers.
The
efforts to get into the imperialistic-diplomatic business of the League-of-Nations countries were begun by the Russians even a number of years before this time. Participation in the
first session of the preparatory disarmament commission was only formally
declined in the spring of 1926, since the session was held in Switzerland and
this country had still refused to give any satisfaction for the murder of
Vorovski (1923 in Geneva). At the end of 1927, at the same
time that Chiang Kai-shek was shooting down Neumann's insurrection in
Canton, the Russians want into the preparatory disarmament conference. They
threw havoc into international diplomacy with their proposal for the "complete
abolition of all fighting forces on land, on sea and in the air", but
soon fell in with the "reasonable" rules of imperialist
foreign policy. As early as March 1928, they drew back, in the "securities
committee" of the League of Nations, from their thesis of the complete
to that of a partial disarmament. Litvinov explained: "Since our
proposal for a complete and general disarmament has been met by most of the
delegations with the idea of a partial disarmament, the soviet delegation has
decided to look about for a common ground with the other delegations, even
though it be on the restricted field of such a partial disarmament".
The stage on which the groupings, coalitions and counter-coalitions
for the future imperialist world war were forged and disrupted had been entered
upon. The Russians displayed a very high de6ree of diplomatic skill in the fog
of this and the following disarmament conferences, which in themselves were
merely designed to conceal the continuous and intensive arming of all the
participants, inclusive of the Soviet Union.
In
the Summer of 1928, the arming powers concluded the Kellogg pact, which was to
be a many-sided agreement regarding the prohibition of war as an instrument of
foreign policy, met with enthusiastic approval throughout the world, was signed
by all the more important States and led practically to this: that, firstly,
the states waged wars without a formal declaration to that effect (e.g. Japan
in Manchuria), and, secondly, the League of Nations, in the case of any
military conflict, declared its incompetence as sponsor of the Kellogg pact. Tschitcherin referred to the Kellogg pact as a part of the
war preparation against the Soviet Union, with which expression he probably
meant to explain and justify the adherence of Russia.
The
advent of the world crisis was accompanied by a great increase of economic and
political uncertainty in world policy. Accordingly, the Russians intensified
their endeavors to assure economic and political understanding with the
capitalist Powers and to hold off all outer disturbances from their work of
construction at home. The year 1929 saw the conclusion of an eastern Kellogg
pact, in which Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania and Russia undertook to
recognize the Kellogg Pact independently of its ratification by the 14 States
by which it was originally concluded. This eastern protocol was adhered to
later by Turkey and Persia.
The
economic business with the capitalist States made progress. In 1930 a trade
agreement was entered into with England, and the one with Italy (dating from
1924) was considerably expanded. In March 1931 the Russians took part in the
international agrarian conference at Rome so as to
promote the export of soviet cereals. They likewise participated in the
agrarian and export conference at Stresa in the autumn of 1932. The relations
with German capitalism became so close that in the spring of 1931 there journeyed
to Moscow a number of German industrialists who
conducted negotiations regarding expansion of Germany's "Russian
business" and came away with over a half-billion gold marks in orders
alone. The soviet orders provided 300 to 400 thousand German workers with "wages
and bread", as the CP press of Germany proudly announced, and a part
of the bankrupt German capitalism with profits and the possibility of
existence, as the same press modestly failed to state.
The
economic diplomacy of the Russians was mostly conducted, however, only in the
interest of their political diplomacy. And in this latter field they were
immeasurably more active. In the spring of 1931, they introduced in the
European committee of the League of Nations the draft of a general
non-aggression pact, which in autumn they laid before the League itself in the
shape of an economic non-aggression pact. These drafts contained, like all the
later agreements and proposals of the sort, a definition of the "aggressor".
All these definitions were distinguished by a formal exactness which met with
general approval. In exchange, the Bolsheviks practically struck from the
soviet lexicon all the conceptions regarding the essence of imperialistic war
as they had been entered there by Lenin. They broke up imperialist policy into
an "aggressive" and a "defensive" one, and thereby went back to the shabby ideology with which
parties of the Second International in the year 1914 justified their support of
war being waged by their national and imperialistic bourgeoisie. And that was
done for quite the same reasons, for the Russians were seeking alliance with
imperialistic bourgeoisies, and they had to look in advance for the ideological
justification of such a coalition policy with imperialist groups, a policy the
practice of which had been delayed by the Social Democracy until the outbreak
of the World War.
The
Bolsheviks pointed the way throughout the world for the system of regional
pacts which distinguishes the distracted foreign policy of imperialism in the
world crisis. In the year 1932, they concluded the nonaggression pacts with the
countries on the western border of Russia: Finland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and
Rumania (with the exclusion of the Bessarabian
question). This diplomatic act of securing the Russian west boundary was
followed by the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with France, which was
ratified in February 1933. This diplomatic step released Russia from Germany
and paved the way for the great change of front in European policy which was
accomplished with Hitler's accession to power. Soviet diplomacy had well
calculated the change of imperialist horses in soviet foreign policy.
In
the year 1932 there were still in existence, besides, non-aggression pacts with
a number of other countries: with Germany, with Italy,
with Turkey, with China, etc. Diplomatic relations with the government of
Chiang Kai-chek, which had been broken off in
December 1927, were likewise resumed in December 1932. The upheavals in the course of the world crisis led a
number of other countries to recognize the Soviet Union definitively:
Spain and the United States in 1933, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia in
1934. The recognition on the part of the three latter came about in the wake of
the Franco-Russian alliance policy, while the U.S.A. became reconciled to the
act because this country could no longer dispense with the Soviet Union in the
game for preeminence in Eastern Asia, the game against Japan.
The
sharp turn in German foreign policy - onto the line of Hitler's old plans for
colonization in the East - brought about, in conjunction with the~
intensification of German arming activity, a reordering of the entire foreign
policy of Europe. Since the methods of fascist domestic policy were also
applied in German diplomacy, Hitler Germany did indeed offend its Versailles
opponents but nevertheless carried out its aims without delay. An essential
success of this policy was the winning of Poland away from allegiance to the
French policy. In consequence, Russia saw herself menaced anew on her western
boundary. She countered by extending (April 1934) for a period of ten years the
non-aggression pacts with the three Baltic states. This diplomatic step was hastened
by Germany's refusal to sign, as Russia had proposed, a protocol regarding the
inviolability of the Baltic states.
The
Bolcheviks have been and are miles removed from conducting anti-fascist foreign
policy. They have been emphasizing for years their good relations with Italy, a
country with which, on the grounds of certain anti-German interests held in
common, they concluded in September 1933 a new non-aggression and neutrality
pact. If the Russians have turned from being an opponent of the League of
Nations and made themselves one of its members, if from being an enemy of the
Versailles treaty they have become its sponsor, if they have converted Germany
from a support to a point of attack of their European diplomacy, that was
determined merely "through certain changes in the policy of
Germany", as Stalin declared at the 17th party Congress of the CPSU in
1934. He further expressly stated that this diplomatic turn was not caused by
the Fascists. On the contrary: "Certainly, we are far from being
charmed by the fascist regime in Germany. Still, it is not a question here of
fascism, as may be clear if only because of the fact that fascism in Italy, for
example, has not stood in the way of the Soviet Union's establishing the best
relations with that country." The question is in general, he said,
merely one of drawing closer to "these or those countries which are not
interested in disturbing the peace". With which Italian fascism, just
as in the minds of certain German pacifists, marches up as a defender of the "peace".
The
change of front on the part of Bolshevist foreign policy was therefore the
consequence of the change of front on the part of German foreign policy. The
Russians were zigzagging between the imperialistic Great Powers in order to put
through their "peace policy"; that is, in order to bring about
and support that coalition of powers which at any given moment may appear the
most reliable for warding off a military attack on the SU and for isolating any
aggressive powers - today, Germany and Japan. France, on her part, as the main
pillar of the bankrupt Versailles system and, standing next door to Germany,
the most directly menaced by Hitler, became one of the main champions of
understanding with Russia. She was able to plan her great counter-moves
against the new German foreign policy, if not without casualties, still on the whole in accordance with the recipe of a preventive
military encircling of Hitler Germany (Poland is a big hole in this ring). In
the autumn of 1934, on France's initiative, Russia was invited by 30 states to
join the League of Nations. The invitation was opposed by only three of the
small European States, which could still afford to preach the rescue of
capitalist morality from Bolshevism: fascist Portugal, half-fascist Holland and
democratic Switzerland. Pravda of Sept. 18, 1934, gave as the ground for
the invitation into the League of Nations, the fear on the part of the inviting
capitalist Powers that "the anti-Soviet plans of the adventurist
elements among the imperialists might be the prelude to a new world war
directed also against a number of imperialist Powers". Izvestia,
however, explained on the previous day that the capitalist world is divided
into two groups: one which at present wants peace, and another which is looking
for the war adventure. The Powers adhering to the League of Nations were
henceforth, after the withdrawal of Japan and Germany, regarded as the peace
group (Italy-Abyssinia!). Stalin, on his part, explained that with the
adherence of Russia, the League of Nations could have a certain braking effect "for
postponing or preventing the occurrence of warlike actions". Litvinov,
finally, pointed in Geneva to the international cooperation of the SU with the
predominant part of the capitalist Powers on the economic, artistic, social,
scientific, and political fields, a co-operation which had now been crowned by
the common goal of the "organization of peace".
After
the impotence of the League of Nations in all questions of assuring the peace
and preventing any warlike attacks in all the years of its existence had by
this time been revealed to even the rosiest of the pacifist-optimists, the
pacifistic effectualness of the League was at last discovered by the
Bolsheviks. Behind their peace protestations there certainly stands a knowledge about the facts. But they are carrying on in
capitalist diplomacy, and it demands that offensive as well as defensive
military alliances be clothed with pacifist phrases.
While
the entry into the League of Nations has brought the Russians a great number of
further diplomatic successes, among which the politico-commercial rapprochement
with England is rated as one of the most important, practically it has above
all legitimized the co-operation between Russia and France. For one thing,
Russia was concerned with the continuation of the security policy on her
western boundary, so that as early as December 1934 negotiations were started
with a view to the eastern pact, which was to be guaranteed primarily by
France. These endeavors, which for the present have miscarried, owing to
resistance of Germany and Poland, the Russians have not yet given up. The real,
essential point of joining the League of Nations, however, the alliance with
France, which doubtless is based upon a military agreement and provides for
mutual security against a German aggression.
But,
true to the very methods of imperialist diplomacy, Bolshevism from the earliest
times of its existence has had two irons in the fire. For a long while the
Comintern was this second iron. That, however, is past. Today the Russians are
concerned with keeping their hands free for new readjustments of their foreign
policy, for broadening and altering their alliance front between the
imperialist Powers themselves. This has been confirmed in the first place by
their east-asiatic policy, insofar as their dealings
there have been with Japan. Since the beginning of the Manchurian advance, they
have endeavored to come to an understanding with Japan (sale of the Eastern
Railway for a song) and to bring about the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.
But the European policy of the SU is likewise a policy of attempts at
rapprochement with its principal adversaries of the moment. The former
cooperation between Russia and Germany is unforgotten in Moscow; unforgotten
the speculation on the plans of the bourgeois wing of the Reichswehr generals,
which still, represents Schleicher’s conception of a co-operation with Russia
(the imperialistic German bourgeoisie has no desire to conquer a "colonizing
land" in the East; it is looking for imperialistic goals). The
Bolsheviks are counting upon a possible break-through of these forces in
Germany, Molotov declared at the 7th soviet congress in January 1935 that "we
had and have no other desire than to continue maintaining good relations with
Germany. Everyone knows that the Soviet Union is filled with a profound impulse
to develop its relations with all States, those with fascist government not
excluded". The "ultra nationalistic race theories" of
the National Socialists, Molotov emphasized, "naturally" form
no hindrance to the development of the Russo-Gerrnan
relations, and added: "Although we have no very high opinion of these
'theories', we do not conceal our respect for the German people as one of the
greatest peoples of the present epoch". The question is merely as to "what
precisely is at the basis of the foreign policy of present-day Germany",
namely, the question whether Hitler's conception of German foreign policy still
holds.
The
actual line of Russian foreign policy at any given time is thus in large
measure determined by the momentary constellation of the imperialist powers.
The measure in which the Bolsheviks carry on this foreign policy depends,
however, on their inner forces. And these in turn have recently been subject to
significant shifts.
The
regime of Bolshevist absolutism has passed a critical point. In accord with its
origin and its conditions of social equilibrium, in the first period of its
development, it supported itself decisively upon the Russian working class. The
proletariat appeared as the politically and economically privileged (even
though very modestly privileged) class. The absolutistic regime of Bolshevism
supported itself predominantly upon the industrial class in
order to form a counterweight to the peasantry, which numerically
constituted an unprecedented majority, and in order to
build up the industrial state-capitalism at forced tempo. The industrializing
of Russia, however, made it possible, in turn, to destroy the private
capitalism of the peasants and to collectivize the land. An agrarian collective
capitalism arose which, on the one hand, was capable of
defending its own interests as against the state apparatus as well as
against the working class, and which, on the other, was able to become the
supporting foundation for the state apparatus itself.
With
the successes of the policy of the second five-year plan, the Bolsheviks have
announced the transformation of Russia from an agrarian into an industrial
country. Between the years 1928 and 1934 the Russian proletariat increased from
17.3 to 28.1 percent of the total population. The number of collective peasants
mounted from 2.9 to 45.9 percent, while the number of individual peasants
declined from 72.9 to 22.5 percent. The working class, to be sure, still
constitutes a minority of the population. However, it is not only highly
organized industrially; it also turns out today the predominant part of all
Bolshevist products. This preponderance, however, compels the absolutistic
regime of the Bolsheviks to draw up the agrarian class as its main support, to
shift the center of gravity of the state apparatus to the weaker side, so as to
maintain the equilibrium of the two classes and thereby, for the absolutistic
peak of the pyramid, the possibility of governing.
The
Russian collectivized peasantry becomes the privileged class of the Soviet
Union. While the industrial assent of Russia down to the year 1929 was
accomplished at the expense of the peasantry, the collectivizing itself was
accomplished at the expense of the proletariat. The billions invested for the
sake of Russian agriculture had to be withdrawn from the industrial sector of
the Russian economy and are in themselves sufficient to explain in large part
the tense social situation in which the Russian proletariat found itself in spite of all five-year-plan successes. The doing away
with bread cards and the succeeding rise in the price of bread was a present to
the collectivized peasants, to whom in 1932 Stalin had promised "well-being".
In the last four years, the government has expended about five billion rubles
for organizing the machine and tractor stations, a sum which had to be raised
by Russian industry. The money indebtedness of the collectives to the State
down to the year 1933, amounting to a total of 435 million rubles, was struck
off the books at the end of 1934, the money accordingly presented to the
peasants as a gift.
Ostensibly,
the collective enterprises, as even the Menshevikess Domanevskaya has now discovered, are of socialist
character. Stalin had, however, as early as the 17th party congress, declared
that the petty-bourgeois equalitarianism of the communes must be liquidated.
The agricultural collectives are guilds, which leave considerable play to the
collective ownership of the peasant. In Feb. 1935, at the congress of the
collective peasants, model statutes drafted by Stalin for the collective
enterprises were adopted. These statutes have deeded the land to the collective
enterprises for all time, as was declared by the secretary of the Moscow party
organization (v. Rundschau, 1935, No. 28). The
nationalized soil has been made the private possession of the peasant
collectives. Every collective peasant feels now, the secretary said further, "that
the general assembly of the members of a collective economy is master over the
collective-economy property, that no 'plentipotentiary'
of any sort can exclude him from the collective economy, that he has an equal
voice in determining the common affairs of the collective economy."
The sharpest tones were adopted in condemning the "absolutely
inadmissible blundering intrusions into the life of the collectives" on
the part of "certain party organizations", to whom it was made
clear that "people who infringe the collective-economy statutes cannot
be tolerated either in the party apparatus or that of the soviets".
The collective peasants, unrestricted masters of their properties, were
accordingly released from the tutelage of the party organs. The "leading
role of the proletariat" over the peasantry was thereby definitively
abolished.
And
as it has been economically, so also politically. Hand in hand with this
astounding reform of the collective went the abolition of the formal
disadvantaging of the peasantry on the political field. The 7th soviet congress
introduced equal, direct and secret suffrage and thereby a sort of "soviet
parliamentarism" by means of which the weight of the peasantry can be
thrown into the scale in all cases of voting. The future soviet congresses will
therefore, just like the congresses of the parliaments which are subordinated
to them, be dominated by peasant majorities. The peak of the Bolshevist state
apparatus thereby frees itself from the pressure of the proletariat, a pressure
which it once needed in its apparatus, but which would now necessarily turn out
to be too dangerous for it. For in spite of all
dictatorial securities, the soviet regime after all exists only on condition of
utilizing the country’s mass forces, to which it has to
render account simultaneously and between which it has to
maneuver.
The
transition of the 'Bolshevist system of absolutism onto the peasantry as its
main support meant, however, the deprivileging of the party strata of
proletarian origine. It represents, moreover, such a break with the party
tradition that it could not come off without producing inner convulsions in the
party apparatus, regardless of the fact that this
party had already been purged dozens of times. Stalin was obliged once more to
oppose his party in order to break its conservatism.
He did this with the usual Bolshevist ruthlessness, in that he introduced, if
not the gradual and complete dismantling of the party apparatus, yet after all
the further depoliticizing of the party. If the predominance of the proletarian
class in soviet absolutism consisted in the factual superiority of the party
apparatus over the state apparatus, while Stalin combined and dominated both,
the predominance of the peasantry in the soviet system will bring it about that
the state apparatus takes a position above the party apparatus.
So
far, this fundamental upheaval has brought forth two measures of the greatest
significance. The first was the Iiquidation of the
union of old Bolsheviks; that is, the destruction of the center of the "proletarian"-revolutionary
tradition of the CPR. (According to bourgeois press reports, Krupskaya was also
taken into custody.)
The
second of these measures was the reorganization (as it was shamefacedly
expressed) of the Young Communist League. Heretofore, this League was organized
according to the "production principle" like the CP itself and
anchored in the factories. It rated as one of the party's most spirited weapons
in the factories and played an important part there as organizer of the shock
brigades, as gatherer of the state loans, etc. It was a lively political
instrument of the Bolshevist party; perhaps the liveliest, for the youth
organization was always at the same time a center of the most various
oppositions and an exponent of "Bolshevist self-criticism", of
which nothing more has been heard for same time. As the relatively weakest link
of the party, the Young Communist League had to knock under first. As early as
Feb. 22, 1935, hence directly following the 7th soviet congress, which elevated
the peasant class to the throne, its "reorganization" was
decided upon. This decision was complied with by the June plenum of the central
committee of the youth organization. The social-democratic standpoint, that the
youth organization has no political, but only educational functions, was here
converted into facto The youth organizations in the factories are being broken
up. The YCL is being redistributed into seven sections: working-class youth,
peasant youth, young pioneers, students, school children, leading YCL organs,
juvenile work of the state and trade organizations. Politically, the YCL is
thereby liquidated, and the field that is left to it is the youthful idyl: "Like
a provident gardener," writes Pravda in an editorial around the
middle of June, "it is called upon to bring up millions of people, to
form their view of the world, to instruct, to nourish and to cherish
them".
With
the accomplishment of this inner-political turn - the political NEP-turn of
Stalin's - the last traditional restraint have fallen
which had previously still existed with respect to Bolshevist foreign policy by
reason of the existence of the communist parties in Europe. The co-operation of
russian state-capitalism with the monopolistic and in
part openly fascist imperialism is henceforth unimpeded by any exterior
consideration whatsoever. The embarrassing revolutionary phraseology can
finally be discarded.
Hitherto,
the "world revolution" was at least on paper recognized as the
first and most essential guarantee against an intervention on the part of
imperialist Powers. Practically, the Bolsheviks relied, however, exclusively on
their diplomacy and on that institution which was rendered possible with its
aid: the highly organized and technicized Red Army.
The late acting president of the soviet of people's commissars, Kuibushev, has
even clothed this undisguisedly in words. In January 1935, at the third soviet
congress of Moscow, he stated: "While we are fighting for peace on the
international arena, we must nevertheless consider that the best assurance
against a war, against an intervention, is as before the increasing might of
the armed defender of our Fatherland, the Red Army of Workers and
Peasants".
Even
before this time, the proletarians who joined the communist parties in good
revolutionary faith and took upon themselves the martyrdom of the fascist
terror no longer counted among the Bolsheviks. In general, they were remembered
with declarations of sympathy or protest resolutions which were not allowed to
affect in the slightest degree the policy of concluding pacts of peace and
friendship between the "Fatherland of all Workers" and their
fascist oppressors. Occasionally, however, the hired writers of the Bolsheviks
also expressed their sentiments more openly. Thus, on the occasion of the
conclusion of the new non-aggression pact with Italy, Peri wrote in the Rundschau (1933, No. 33) with a shameless cynicism
of which the equal would no doubt be hard to discover: "On the part of
our Italian brothers in arms who are suffering in the penitentiaries and on the
islands of exile, the fact that their torturers are compelled to deal with the
representatives of that revolutionary order for whose triumph the noblest of
our comrades have offered up their freedom will be interpreted as an incentive
to resistance and to struggle." The communist worker had accordingly
long been abandoned when the Comintern was still conducting the "anti-fascist"
pseudo-struggle against those Powers which were already tied up in the
closest manner with the Soviet Union.
With
the latest Franco-Russian pact, however, in which it was no longer a question
of a diplomatic agreement, but of direct military co-operation, the leaders of
Bolshevism were obliged to give up even the appearance of a "revolutionary"
equivocalness. Obviously, the French insisted upon guarantee against a
disturbance policy on the part of the CP of France. Stalin gave them. He
assured LavaI, on the occasion of his visit to Moscow,
that France is naturally obliged to adopt measures in the interest of her military
defense. Izvestia wrote on May 16: "The task of the public
opinion of both countries is the support of the policy of their governments,
which is the policy of peace and of defense."
The
pact with France was followed by that with Czechoslovakia, which forthwith
adhered to the Franco-Russian pact by reason of her menaced position between
Hitler Germany and contested Austria. The Izvestia presented the ground
for this new alliance (until 1934 no diplomatic relations had existed between
the two countries) in the following words: "German fascism, in order to
conceal its policy of conquest, may fashion a theory according to which the
Slavic peoples supply the manure of history. But the Soviet Union, while taking
no stock in any sort of pan-slavic masquerades,
vouches in every manner that it deems the defense of the slavic
peoples, who are in danger of being attacked, as no less well-grounded and
worthy of support than is the defense of France".
Since
the remaining apparatus of the Comintern parties no longer has any life of its
own, the readjustment of their policy to the new situation was not accompanied
by the slightest inner difficulties. The policy of military alliances with
capitalist States required the liquidation of the disturbance policy of the
Comintern parties in the countries in question. Moscow carried out this
liquidation, which presages the early end of the European CP's
in general. The way to this end is twofold. In the first place, it was
necessary that the French and Czech parties should swing into the line of
national defense. That occurred promptly. Of course, the French CP was faced
with the difficult task of combining this line with the traditional
anti-militarism of the French working masses. It spoke cautiously and
diplomatically. "The mutual assistance embraces the corresponding
measures for the defense of peace", wrote Magnien
on May 16 in L'Humanité. "In order to
preserve the peace, a Bolshevik should do everything". declared
Vaillant Couturier, two days later in the same sheet. He compared the pact with
the New Economic Policy (NEP). It was a question, he said, of gaining time in order to postpone the War and protect "our
Socialist Fatherland. No other reasons, he added, are discoverable in the
words of Stalin. Furthermore, it was protested that the CPF remains the
defender of the French soldiers and wants to win the army. Practically.
however, all that remained to do was to demand that the fascist and reactionary
officers be driven out of the army, since one could not after all confide to
them the serious defense of the USSR.
In
Czechoslovakia, where nationalism on the one hand and the social-democratic
tameness of the CP on the other were considerably greater, the matter was
rendered easier. Sverma, a newly elected
parliamentarian of the CPCz, declared on May 24 at a
CP meeting in Prague that the Czech communists, in case the Czechoslovakian
army would fight consistently against German imperialism, would support this
struggle and come out for the army. He declared himself in favor of maintaining
the independence of the Czech nation, which could be assured by an army purged
of fascists.
In order to make this "defense-of-the-fatherland"
policy effectual in the policy of the allied capitalist nations, in harmony
with the designs of soviet diplomacy, the Comintern would once more have to
seek out the corresponding parliamentary field. That meant practically that the
Comintern parties had to be annexed to the Social Democracy of the countries in
question. The united front with the heads of "social fascism"
became all of a sudden the
one and only line-true watchword of the various CP's.
ln France there arose the "front commun",
releasing waves of enthusiasm and fake activity. If the negotiations as a whole did not proceed so smoothly as might have been
expected, this was owing to the fact that differences
arose regarding the question of the extension of this front. While the CP
wanted to draw in even the left-bourgeois parties (if coalition anyhow, then
all the way to the democratic bourgeoisie!), the Social Democrats opposed to
this their traditional No, and thus acquired among the French workers the
reputation of being the most radioal, the "leftest" of all the parties. However, Blum, at the
congress of his party in Muhlhausen (June 1935) could
not deny "that the declarations of Stalin are in accord with the
decisions adopted regarding the national defense by the French Socialist Party
in Tours three years ago and consequently served the future organizational
unity of socialists and communists. In case of a German invasion, all
proletarians would rise against the outer enemy, for the defeat of France would
mean the defeat of Russia". (NZZ of June 13.) It is quite conceivable
that Moscow will even decree the direct liquidation of its European offshoots,
if things go still farther. If the Bolsheviks succeed in winning an indirect
influence upon the social-democratic parties, without being responsible for
them, that will be the most favorable to the plans of Moso in the present world
situation. (This tendency to combine by moving to the side of the Social
Democracy is not confined to the Muscovites , but is running , through all the various Bolshevist currents. The
Trotskyists of Francie, of Switzerland, etc., are already in the Social
Democracy, and in other countries they are working in a similar direction. The
CPO of Schaffhausen (Switzerland) accomplished its union with the SPS at the
beginning of July 1935.)
The
procession to the Social Democracy has been followed by the Swiss CP without
reserve. After a campaign in opposition to the social-democratic and
trade-union "crisis initiative", shortly before the vote was taken it
issued a call for support of this initiative. The situation, naturally, had "fundamentally
changed". The SPS had, to be sure, proposed an extensive elimination
of Parliament for the carrying through of the initiative, but the Federal
Council (Bundesrat), had in mind still more extensive full powers for
itself. So the CPS preferred, in' accordance with the
approved social-democratic recipe of the lesser evil, the half to the
three-quarter dictatorship. This tumble was followed by the offer of a united
front to the SPS, which in turn was followed by preparations for the
dissolution of the red-union opposition (RGO) in Basel. The SPS set five
conditions; among others, the liquidation of the RGO and other such separate CP
organizations, suspension of all attacks upon the social-democratic policy, particularly
upon the social-democratic functionaries in the administrative apparatus, and
unconditional assent to the Swiss "Plan of Labor". The CPS had
as a matter of course to subscribe to all this. It was even obliged to swallow
the ironic remark of the SPS executive committee to the effect that at any rate
no co-operation with bourgeois parties was involved, such as had been demanded
by the French communists.
Just
as down to the year 1932 it was "social fascism", so at the
present time the "united front" has become the axis of all CP
policy. Bela Kun, in a long article in No. 11 of the "Communist
International", analyzed the tactic and the successes of the various CP's on the occasion of the
united-front demonstrations on May 1. As to the German question, he expatiated
as follows: If the majority of the SPG executive committee in Prague is really
trying to support the imperialist war policy of HitIer
Germany, in order to get back into the game, then there is need for
establishing a much closer contact between the communists and the left members
and groups of the SPG for the creation of "lively examples of the
united front" and for "strengthening the broad mass pressure
upon the SPG executive committee in Prague". These interesting
disquisitions demonstrate, first, that the CP must be in very poor standing
with the German workers, for otherwise it would not turn to the SPG executive
committee after it had declared, following Hitler's victory: The SPG remains
the principal enemy. They prove, furthermore, that the Comintern is here "fighting"
merely for a bit of influence upon the remaining props of a social-democratic
apparatus which history has already shown the door, an apparatus which at the
time the Kun article was written was putting an end to the struggle of the "Leftists"
for their share' of the million marks in the possession of the party's
executive committee, in that it threw these latter out of its enterprise for
compensating its own services with respect to the German workers. Besides at
the present time the German secret police (Gestapo) has gone a long way
in wiping up the illegal SPG apparatus, made further numerous arrests and thus
reaped the harvest which had been prepared for it by two spies in the central
committee of the SP in Germany. At the moment the SPG
centra! Committee, according to our certain information, no longer has any
connections whatsoever toward Germany, and has decided not to attempt making
any for some months to come.
Thus,
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has logically, growing out of the
original situation of the Russian revolution, ended up as a link in the system
of imperialist alliance policy. Corresponding to the momentary needs at the
different halting places along this way, it has directed the communist parties,
on the back of the European proletariat, up to the point at which their
political liquidation in favor of the national-reformist policy of the Social
Democracy has already become merely a question of form. This is not taking
place without the recent illusionary working up of the "united-front"
enthusiasm of a European proletariat which in the present period of universal
counter-revolution and reaction has run hopelessly into the blind alley of
national limitation. Its further course can only be a further bit-by-bit
collapse. A sound class-reaction against the continuing ideological and
practical decline is at the moment not yet visible in
the European countries even in the most modest beginnings. It appears that
Social-democratism and Bolshevism must continue their work of destruction of
any proletarian force of action even to the bitter end before the proletarian
turn becomes at all possible. But the world situation is overloaded in such a
way with economic and political difficulties, counterforces and contradictions
that this proletarian turn will in the long run unavoidably come about. The
ruins of all "old" labor "movement" will make
the path of the reascent an incomparably painful one, but they will also
finally leave it clear.
International
Council Correspondence Vol. II Nos. 3&4 March 1936 https://aaap.be/Pdf/International-Council-Correspondence/International-Council-Correspondence-2-03-04a.pdf
Transcribed
and spelled according to modern U.S. English (MS Word): F.C. June 2026
See
also on Marxistisk Arbejder
Politik, 1931-1936 : https://aaap.be/Pages/Marxistisk-Arbejder-Politik.html